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Notes
AMALGAMATED FOOD EMPLOYERS LOCAL
590 v. LOGAN VALLEY PLAZA, INC.:
THE RIGHT TO PICKET ON A PRIVATELY
OWNED SHOPPING CENTER
In Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court held that peaceful
nonemployee picketing of a shopping center store could not be
absolutely enjoined on the basis of trespass to private property.
Since the shopping center was freely accessible and open to the
public it was the functional equivalent of a downtown business
block for the purpose of exercising first amendment rights.2 The
decision marked the first time the Supreme Court has ruled on
this precise issue.8 The problem in this area is primarily one of
accomodating conflicting interests: the union's interest in peace-
ful picketing for a lawful purpose must be balanced against the
interest of the shopping center owner in the possession and en-
joyment of his property. This Note will trace the background of
picketing on private property, analyze the competing interests in-
1. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
2. Id. at 325.
3. The Supreme Court specifically left this question open in Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.:
One final point remains to be considered. At two of respondent's
stores, located in suburban shopping centers, the picketing occurred
on land owned by or leased to respondent though open to the pub-
lic for access to the stores. As one of the reasons for finding the
picketing unlawful, the Court of Appeals recited this fact, and
"trespassing upon plaintiff's property" is one of the activities
specifically enjoined. Whether a state may frame and enforce an
injunction aimed marrowly at a trespass of this sort is a question
that is not here.
353 U.S. 23, 24 (1957).
volved, evaluate the approach of Logan Valley to the problem, and
set forth questions which remain unanswered.
Respondent Logan Valley Plaza owned a large, newly de-
veloped shopping center complex. It was located on a heavily
traveled highway with five entrance roads. The other respondent,
Weis Markets, one of two businesses then in the center, owned
and operated a supermarket. Weis had an open but covered porch
along the front of its building, and a five-foot wide and forty-foot
long parcel pick-up zone along the porch. Between this building
and the highway were extensive parking lots.
Weis opened for business with a wholly nonunion staff of
employees and, in addition, posted signs prohibiting trespassing or
soliciting on its porch or parking lot. A few days later the peti-
tioner union began picketing Weis, carrying signs saying the super-
market was nonunion and its employees were not "receiving union
wages or other benefits." The pickets were all employees of com-
petitors of Weis. The picketing was carried out almost exclusively
in the parcel pick-up area and in the immediately adjacent portion
of the parking lot. The picketing was entirely peaceful and un-
accompanied by either threats or violence.
Respondents obtained an ex parte order which had the effect
of requiring that all picketing be carried on along the berms beside
the public roads outside the shopping center.4 Picketing continued
along the berms and handbills were distributed asking the public
not to patronize Weis because it was nonunion. Petitioners con-
tested the validity of the order, but the original injunction was con-
tinued indefinitely without modification. The rationale of the
trial court was two fold:
(a) that the picketing was upon private property and,
therefore, unlawful in manner because it constituted a
trespass; (b) that the aim of the picketing was to compel
Weis to require its employees to become members of the
Union and, therefore, the picketing, albeit peaceful, was for
an unlawful purpose.5
4. The injunction restrained the union from: "... (1) picketing
and trespassing on Weis' property, i.e., the store proper, the porch and the
parcel pickup area; (2) picketing and trespassing upon Logan's property,
i.e., the parking area and entrances and exists thereto; (3) physically
interfering with Weis' business invitees entering or leaving the store or
parking area; (4) violence toward Weis' business invitees; (5) interference
with Weis' employees in the performance of their duties." 425 Pa. 382, 385,
227 A.2d 874, 876 (1967). Petitioners did not challenge the prohibitions
contained in the last three parts of the injunction.
5. 425 Pa. at 385, 227 A.2d at 876. In so holding, the trial court spe-
cifically rejected the union's claim that the first amendment entitled them
to picket on the shopping center property, and also their claim that the
suit was within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. This later claim was
based on the principle that when a dispute is arguably subject to the
NLRB's jurisdiction, the Board must be given the first opportunity to hear
the case. E.g., Great Leopard Market Corp. v. Meat Cutters Local 196,
413 Pa. 143, 196 A.2d 657 (1964). State courts may accept jurisdiction in
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On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the issu-
ance of the injunction on the first ground only, that is, petitioners'
conduct constituted a trespass on respondents' property.' The
United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded adopting the
rule that the exercise of first amendment rights may not be wholly
excluded on property which serves as a community business block
and which is open to the public generally.
7
PICKETING ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
In Thornhill v. Alabama,8 the Supreme Court held that peace-
ful picketing must be afforded the same constitutional guarantees
as other forms of free speech. This holding was later extended in
AFL v. Swing to protect pickets who were nonemployees of the
picketed establishment. These and related cases'0 established the
principle that peaceful picketing carried on in a location generally
open to the public is protected by the first amendment from arbi-
trary and indiscriminate prohibition.
But the Supreme Court has recognized that picketing involves
both speech and conduct. Because of this mixture of both pro-
tected and unprotected elements, picketing may be subject to con-
trols not constitutionally permissible in the case of pure speech.
As a result, states are permitted to enjoin picketing when it in-
volves a purpose antithetical to some valid state policy, or when it
involves violence or coercion." Although the precise issue in Lo-
such a case only when it is ceded to them by the Board. Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
6. 425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967). Petitioners pre-emption claim
was not argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and accordingly
was not passed on. Petitioners did, however, raise their pre-emption con-
tention before the United States Supreme Court, but that Court was pre-
cluded from reaching the merits of the question. "The rule that in cases
coming from state courts this Court may review only those issues which
were presented to the state court is not discretionary but jurisdictional."
391 U.S. at 334 (dissenting opinion).
7. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
8. 310 U.S. 58 (1940).
9. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
10. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958);
Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery and
Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
11. See, e.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (violence);
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing to have em-
ployer force his employees to join a union); UAW v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (violence); Steamfitters Local 10
v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing to have employer require union
membership as a condition of employment, in violation of state right-to-
gan Valley was one of first impression for the Supreme Court, the
confrontation between picketing and private property rights be-
gan much earlier. The reasoning of these earlier cases is relevant
to an understanding of later state cases involving shopping centers
and also for a proper evaluation of Logan Valley itself.
Peaceful labor picketing on the private property of an employer
has generally been upheld, at least where the property in ques-
tion was generally open to the public. In People v. Mazo,1 2 the de-
fendant was convicted of a criminal trespass for picketing and
handing out leaflets in the parking lot of the employer. In re-
versing the conviction, the court found that the employer had
virtually dedicated the parking area to public use, and held that
where rights of property and free speech conflict, the former must
give way.'3  In Hearn Department Stores, Inc. v. Livingston,'14 an
employer sought to restrain employee picketing on the ground
that the picketing took place on a private street. The court held
for the defendants concluding that ". . . the relationship of em-
ployer and employee does not end where the plaintiff's lines com-
mence and necessarily it carries with it the right to picket peace-
fully as an incident of a bona fide labor dispute."'u In Stafford V.
Hood,16 however, the right to picket on the private property of
the employer on the theory that it was a quasi-public was specifi-
cally rejected. The court felt that the invitation to the public to use
the lot as customers did not include an invitation to use it to keep
customers away.17
Cases involving union activity other than picketing have also
work law); Building Service Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950) (picketing to have employer force his employees to join a union,
contrary to state statute forbidding such employer coercion); Teamsters
Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (picketing to enlist union delivery-
men and union patrons to force self-employer to abide by union working
conditions); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (picketing to
have employer practice racial discrimination in hiring, contrary to state
policy); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (pick-
eting to induce wholesale distributors to agree with union not to sell to
nonunion peddlers, in violation of state statute forbidding combinations in
restraint of trade); Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722
(1942) (coercion of an employer to do an act which state public policy
declared should be left to his free choice); Hotel Employees Local 122 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942) (violence);
Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287
(1941) (violence).
12. 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,835 (Ill. Ct. C1. 1959).
13. Id.
14. 125 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1953).
15. Id. at 801. A variation of this argument is that the complaining
employer, as owner of the adjoining property, also owns the underlying fee
to the center of the street. Attempts to bar picketing on public streets or
sidewalks on this theory have, however, been unsuccessful. Vonder-
schmitt v. McGuire, 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 N.E. 585 (1935); Robinson v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 35 Idaho 418, 207 P. 132 (1922).




generally allowed statutory and constitutional rights to prevail
over strictly private property rights. In NLRB v. LeTourneau
Co.,"8 the Supreme Court held that employees had the right to
distribute union literature on company-owned parking lots. Al-
though rejecting the idea that the union activity could be enjoined
solely on the basis of trespass, LeTourneau nevertheless indicated
that labor activity could be prohibited if it interfered with plant
discipline or production. 19 In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,20
however, the Court refused to extend LeTourneau to nonemployee
union activity. But this holding was watered down when the
Court added the qualification that nonemployees could not be ex-
cluded from company property if the usual means of communi-
cating with the employees were not present or if the nonsolici-
tation rule was applied in a discriminatory manner.
21
In 1946, the Supreme Court handed down a decision which
has become the cornerstore for cases allowing picketing on private
property. Marsh v. Alabama22 held there are certain circumstances
in which property that is privately owned may, at least for first
amendment purposes, be treated as though it were publicly held. 23
In Marsh a Jehovah's Witness distributed religious literature on a
sidewalk in the business district of a company-owned town.24
The company had posted signs against solicitation of any kind and
refused to grant Marsh a permit. She continued distributing liter-
ature and was arrested for violating Alabama's criminal trespass
18. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
19. Id. at 804 n.10 (dictum).
20. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
21. Id. at 112.
22. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
23. The significance of equating private property with publicly held
property is that in the business area of a municipality persons may not be
excluded from exercising their first amendment rights, including the right
to picket, on the sole ground that title to the property was in the mu-
nicipality. Jamison v. State, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). This does not mean, however, that mu-
nicipalities may not control the use of public property. If property is not
ordinarily open to the public, access to it for the purpose of exercising
first amendment rights may be denied altogether. Adderley v. State, 385
U.S. 39 (1966). Even where such property is open to the public gener-
ally, the exercise of first amendment rights may be regulated to prevent
interference with the use to which the property is ordinarily put by the
state. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Cox v. State,
379 U.S. 559 (1965).
24. The Court noted that the town and its shopping district were
accessible and freely used by the public in general. Nothing was found to
distinguish it from any other town or shopping center except that title to
the property belonged to a private corporation.
statute. In reversing her confiction, the Court balanced the in-
terest in ownership of private property with the interest of free-
dom of expression. The majority said:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it.
25
Marsh was the primary authority for People v. Barisi,2 in
which defendants peacefully picketed the lessee of space in the
Pennsylvania Railroad station. Although the picketing was on
private property, the court said that by opening the premises to
the general public, the owners "have made it a quasi-public place.
'27
As such their ownership could not take precedence over the exer-
cise of first amendment rights. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB28
applied the Marsh doctrine in upholding the rights of nonemploy-
ees to conduct organizational activities on privately owned prop-
erty. The activity took place on a company-owned court-way
which divided a department store at street level. The court found
that the court-way had assumed the character of a public street
and therefore the company could not prohibit constitutionally pro-
tected activities. 29 In People v. Goduto,80 however, Illinois limited
Marsh to its facts and refused to extend its rationale to cover the
parking lot of a store.
Thus, with few exceptions,81 the courts have allowed statutory
and constitutional rights to prevail over strictly private property.
rights.3 2  Nevertheless, peaceful union activity and the exercise
of other first amendment rights on the property of employers and
company-owned towns is significantly different than when car-
ried on in a privately owned shopping center. In the latter case
the property is opened to and used by the general public. In
addition it involves the right of an owner, a disinterested party to
the labor dispute, to prohibit trespassing on his property. None of
the cases thus far discussed involved this precise question. Yet,
25. 326 U.S. at 506. Despite this statement, later state court decisions
involving shopping centers and which followed Marsh, did not balance the
competing rights, but instead based their holdings only on property use and
physical characteristics. E.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonder-
land Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963); Moreland
Corp. v. Retail Employees Local 444, 16 Wis.2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962);
State v. Williams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,708, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Balt. Crim.
Ct. 1959).
26. 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1948).
27. Id. at 935, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 279.
28. 200 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1953).
29. Id. at 380.
30. 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E. 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
31. E.g., Stafford v. Hood, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1963);
People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
(1961); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
32. For other related cases using this rationale, see, e.g., NLRB v.
Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
Notes
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when the advent of the modern suburban shopping center made
the issue inevitable, the couits drew on the reasoning of these
older cases to resolve the problem.
SHOPPING CENTERS AND THE AccOMODATION
OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Only by a thorough consideration of the conflicting values
involved can the issue of the legality of peaceful picketing on a
private shopping center by properly resolved. A union has a
legitimate interest in peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose. Pick-
eting is an integral component of collective bargaining and as such
it involves the exercise of a statutory right. More importantly, in
the absence of other factors involving purpose or manner, peaceful
picketing is an exercise of freedom of speech and is a constitution-
ally sanctioned right.A3 On the other hand, the shopping center
owner has an interest in the possession and enjoyment of his prop-
erty. The owner of the particular store being picketed has a right
to serve his customers free from probable or actual interference
with the operation of his business. Unfortunately, of the few
courts who have ruled on the precise issue, most have based their
decisions upon the physical characteristics and the use made of the
property by its owner, instead of attempting to balance the com-
peting interests involved.34
In State v. Williams,"5 union members peacefully picketed a
drugstore located within a shopping center. Although the owner
of the property had specifically posted it against picketing, the
Baltimore Criminal Court reversed a conviction for criminal tres-
324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1948).
33. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
34. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center,
Inc., a related case not involving picketing, also based its holding on the
physical characteristics and use to which the property was put. An evenly
divided court upheld the right to distribute, in a shopping center mall,
handbills discouraging the purchase of nonunion made goods. In relying on
the nature of the property's appearance, the court stated:
The change from the operation of a single store by a storekeeper
to a large, complex, multiple shopping center, alters the very na-
ture of the operation from one of a purely private character to
one of public or quasi-public character. The single storekeeper
would still be authorized to prevent any unauthorized intrusion on
his private property. The defendants, through this large develop-
ment, in a highly urban area, no longer can claim the same rights
to their property. The property of the defendants has lost its
identity as private property.
370 Mich. 547, 564-65, 122 N.W.2d 785, 794 (1963).
35. 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,708, 44 L.R.R.M. 2357 (Balt. Crim. Ct. 1959).
pass. The court cited Marsh as controlling and held (1) that by
opening the shopping center to the public it became a quasi-public
place, and (2) the lessee of the property had no more rights than
the lessee of property fronting on a public street.
Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444,86 involv-
ing peaceful picketing on privately owned sidewalks, also relied on
physical characteristics and use of the property. The court af-
firmed an order below refusing summary judgment because it was
not clear whether the owner, by designing its property for use as a
shopping center, thereby lost its right to ban otherwise lawful
picketing as a trespass. In applying the Marsh concept of quasi-
public property, the court stated:
If the record before us clearly established that the prop-
erty involved is a multi-store shopping center, with side-
walks simulated so as to appear public in nature, we would
have no difficulty in reaching a conclusion that the prop-
erty rights of the shopping center owner must yield to the
rights of freedom of speech and communications which at-
tend peaceful picketing.3 7
In Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207,31 the merits of the
case were never reached because the court held the right to an
injunction to be arguably subject to the National Labor Relations
Act, and that therefore the lower court lacked jurisdiction to deter-
mine the controversey. The concurring opinion, however, is im-
portant because of its understanding of the conflicting interests
involved. Judge Hill, quoting the opinion of the trial court, said
there were some situations where picketing would always be barred.
But there were other situations where every court would require
the owner to suffer infringement of his right to control his prop-
erty. Five factors were listed which, if present, should result in
having the court weigh the equities of the parties:
(1) When the private property owner designs his property
for use by the general public in such a manner as to make
it difficult or impossible to distinguish its physical charac-
teristics from publicly-owned property similarly so devoted;
(2) The exercise of the right of free speech is for the pur-
pose of making a communication to persons naturally upon
the premises as a result of the inherent nature of the pri-
mary use to which the property is devoted; (3) A similar
communication clearly would be permitted under identical
circumstances had the property been public; (4) Interfer-
ence with the owner's fundamental rights of privacy or per-
sonal use and occupancy is not involved as distinguished
from control, and no direct pecuniary loss will result to the
owner; (5) The trespasser had no place or means available
as an alternate, or the only alternate would be unrealistic or
impractical to the point where there exists a serious restric-
tion upon the trespasser's ability to communicate as effec-
36. 16 Wis. 2d 499, 144 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
37. Id. at 505, 114 N.W.2d at 879.
38. 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
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tively as would naturally and normally be expected were
the legal title in public ownership. 9
Consideration of these factors would enable a court to balance
the magnitude and character of the invasion of the property rights
against the seriousness and nature of the restriction upon the tres-
passer's freedom of speech.
In only one case involving picketing of a shopping center,
however, was the problem recognized as one of accommodating
conflicting interests. In refusing to enjoin the picketing as a tres-
pass, the court in Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers
Local 3140 found that the interests of the union outweighed the
interests of the lessor owner who sought to vindicate a theoretical
invasion of his right to exclusive control and possession of private
property. Noting that an injunction would deprive the union of
communicating with the public at the most effective point of
persuasion, the court stated that ". . . [t] he interest of the union thus
rests upon the solid substance of public policy and constitutional
right; the interest of the plaintiff lies in the shadow cast by a
property right worn thin by public usage."41
LOGAN VALLEY: A NARROW HOLDING AND FUTURE PROBLEMS
Although not enunciated as such, the Court in Logan Valley
discussed each of the five criteria set forth by Judge Hill in Free-
man. Thus, Logan Valley is to be commended for recognizing the
factors which are determinative of this type of case. Nevertheless,
their restrictive holding did not result in a true accommodation of
the conflicting interests. 42
The first test is whether the private property was so designed
for use by the general public that its physical characteristics are
indistinguishable from public property designed for the same pur-
pose. Here the Court relied heavily on Marsh, saying that the
shopping center and the business block in Marsh were virtually
identical. Not only was such reliance on Marsh not necessary but
it was also misguided. In that case, the company town was found
to have all the attributes of a municipality and the company was
39. Id. at 432, 363 P.2d at 806.
40. 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 906 (1965).
41. Id. at 774-75, 394 P.2d at 926, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
42. "All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as
the community business block ...the State may not delegate the power,
through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of
the public wishing to exercise their first Amendment rights ...... 391
U.S. at 319.
found to be exercising official power as a delegate of the state.48
The only municipal attribute of a shopping center is that it re-
sembles a business district. The reasoning of a case so factually
different should not be applied indiscriminately to the shopping
center problem. The majority should have extended Marsh in-
stead of trying to draw such a close analogy. As will be discussed
later, more substantial reasons existed for refusing to bar the
picketing completely than the mere physical characteristics of the
property.
The second test is whether the purpose of the picketing is to
communicate with those persons naturally upon the premises be-
cause of the use to which the property is put. In Logan Valley
there is no question that the pickets were attempting to inform
patrons of Weis that the market was nonunion, and that the cus-
tomers were there as a result of an invitation by Weis.
The third factor, that the communication clearly would be
permitted had the property been public, was likewise present.
44
The majority's position is strengthened by the fact that barring
picketing solely on the basis of title to the property would create
an artificial distinction between shopping center businesses and
downtown businesses when in fact there is little practical differ-
ence. It would allow suburban stores to immunize themselves
by creating large parking lots to separate them from the public
streets, while their downtown counterparts would be subject to
on-the-spot criticism for their practices.
As applied to the facts in Logan Valley, the fourth inquiry
shows equities in favor of both sides. Lack of interference with
the owner's right of privacy and no direct pecuniary loss weigh
heavily in favor of allowing the picketing. Because of the public
character of a shopping center, the claimed infringement of the
right of personal use and occupancy is largely theoretical. Unlike
a situation involving a private place of residence, the owner of a
business establishment can make no meaningful claim to a pro-
tection of his right of privacy. He is merely asserting naked title
and the absolute right to prohibit the use of his property by
others. Such claims fail to realize that those rights carry con-
comitant burdens when the property is used by the public. On the
other hand, the owner is entitled to be protected in the normal
business operation of his property. Here there was some question
as to probable or actual interference in the parcel pick-up zone.45
43. The Court in Marsh emphasized that the property consisted of
residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant
and a business block. 326 U.S. at 502.
44. See note 23 supra.
45. The trial court found that "'(7) .... (a) small groups of men and
women wearing placards . . .walked back and forth in front of the Wies
supermarket, more particularly in the pick-up zone adjacent to the covered
porch (emphasis added); (b) occasional picketing as above described has
Notes
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As pointed out by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion, a parcel
pick-up zone is an integral part of any modern supermarket.46
The place where a customer comes to pick up the goods he has
purchased is as much a part of the store as the inside counters
where customers select the goods or the check-out section where
the goods are paid for. Certainly, pickets would not be allowed
to enter the store itself. For the same reasons, an owner has a
legitimate interest in banning even nonobstructive picketing in the
parcel pick-up zone, an area intimately connected with the normal
business operation of the store.
The fifth element to be considered is the availability of an
alternative place or means to communicate effectively with the
public. The union's message can be effectively communicated only
if it is focused upon the patrons of a particular store; this can be
accomplished only by picketing that store.47 Restricting the pick-
eting to the shopping center's entrances and the berms along the
public road, as was done in Logan Valley, has a number of draw-
backs. First, it prevents the union from focusing attention upon
the disfavored store. Secondly, it exposes the pickets to danger by
forcing them to walk along heavily traveled roads. Finally, picket-
ing the entrance to an area which serves a number of stores could
conceivably expose the union to a charge of conducting a secondary
boycott.
48
Even though Logan Valley recognized that the above five
criteria were determinative factors in a case of this type, the de-
cision was based primarily on the finding that the shopping center
was the functional equivalent of the company town in Marsh.49
The Court was correct in its narrow holding that access to the
taken place on the covered porch itself (emphasis added),...'" 391
U.S. at 327 (dissenting opinion).
46. Id. at 327-8.
47. See generally GouLD, Union Organizational Rights and the Con-
cept of "Quasi-Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965).
48. When a common situs is picketed (a situation where primary and
neutral employers occupy the same premises) the union must confine its
message to the disfavored store so as not to dissuade customers from
buying and employees from working at other establishments inside the
center because of the belief that the shopping center as a whole is the ob-
ject of the protest. The requirements which must be met for the picketing
of the shared premises to be termed primary and not secondary are:
"(a) [t]he picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute
is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the
picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the
situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location
of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with
the primary employer. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549 (1950).
49. 391 U.S. at 325.
shopping center may not be absolutely denied solely on the basis
of trespass. Nevertheless, they missed the opportunity to set forth
clear guidelines to be followed in future cases.
In addition, the Court did not balance the interests of the
instant parties. The majority stated:
Because the Pennsylvania courts have held that "picketing
and trespassing" can be prohibited aboslutely on respon-
dents' premises, we have no occasion to consider the ex-
tent to which respondents are entitled to limit the location
and manner of the picketing or the number of pickets with-
in the mall in order to prevent interference with either ac-
cess to the market building or vehicular use of the parcel
pick-up area and parking lot.5 0
This statement ignores the wording of the injunction, which en-
joined petitioners from
(a) Picketing and trespassing upon the private prop-
erty of plaintiff Weis Markets, Inc., . .. including as
such private property the storeroom, porch and parcel
pick-up area.
(b) Picketing and trespassing upon the private prop-
erty of plaintiff Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., . . . including
parking area and all entrances and exits leading to said
parking area. 51
As previously stated, the parcel pick-up area is as much an integ-
ral part of the business operation of the store as the inside count-
ers.5 2 Picketing which interferes with customers in either place
should be prohibited. The injunction contained separate and
easily divisible parts. Its wording clearly differentiated between
picketing within the confines of the shopping center in general
and on Weis' porch and pick-up area in particular. By sustaining
the first part of the injunction, the Court could have balanced the
union's interest in having access to the shopping center with the
property owner's interest in not having the operation of his
business impaired.
The majority said that state courts may still make reasonable
regulations of picketing on respondents' property. By failing to
give any indication of what is a reasonable regulation, however,
two important questions are left unanswered: (1) to what extent
may pickets utilize the property of the non-participant shopping
center owner; and (2) whether pickets may be totally barred from
areas adjacent to the participant store which are intimately con-
nected with its business operation. Although what is a reasonable
regulation will vary with the particular case, an affirmance of the
first part of the injunction in Logan Valley would have been a
50. Id. at 321.
51. Brief for Petitioner at 20, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). The opinion of the Court of
Common Pleas of Blair County, Pennsylvania, is unreported.
52. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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strong indication of what is permissible.
A further problem is whether the rule concerning shopping
centers will be extended to other business establishments which
have sidewalks or parking lots on their own property. If the
physical characteristics and use of the property must be the func-
tional equivalent of the company town in Marsh, the answer must
be no. If, however, an attempt is made to balance the competing
interests by adopting the five point test of Freeman, such picketing
could very well be upheld.
Another unanswered question is whether all first amendment
rights will be permitted when exercised in shopping centers. Fu-
ture problems could include distribution of religious literature,
other types of union activity, protests, and political campaigning.
The facts of Logan Valley only involved the right to picket; yet
the Court continually refers to first amendment rights, which indi-
cates that other activities will also be protected. On the other
hand, the Court said the rights must be exercised ". . . in a manner
and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the
property is put."5 This indicates that certain qualifications may
be imposed. State v. Miller,54 a state case decided shortly after
Logan Valley, interpreted that decision broadly, as one not limited
to the right to picket. Defendants had entered a shopping center
for the purpose of distributing pamphlets on behalf of certain
political candidates, and were convicted of trespassing on private
property. In reversing the conviction, the Minnesota Supreme
Court noted that the shopping center had many diverse business
on its premises and was generally open to the public. Logan
Valley was cited and held to control these facts. It therefore
appears that any nonobstructive exercise of a first amendment
right will be protected, even though the activity may have no
connection whatsoever with the shopping center's occupants or
with the conduct of their businesses.
CONCLUSION
The modern shopping center has created a situation where
traditional private property rights can no longer maintain their
sanctity. The technical distinctions upon which a finding of tres-
pass so often depends must yield to the statutory and constitu-
tional right to picket. Yet, at the same time the property owner's
rights have not been wholly lost. The natural operation of his
53. 391 U.S. at 319-20.
54. 159 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1968).
business must not be impaired and the picketing must be for a
purpose connected with the use of the property. In Logan Valley,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized only the rights of the
property owner. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court
recognized only the right to picket. The approach that should
have been taken is to recognize that both parties have valid but
antithetical rights, and that the problem in each case of this type
is one of accommodating conflicting interests.
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